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Abstract
Following the EU Gender Directive, that obliges insurance companies to charge the
same premium to policyholders of dierent genders, we address the issue of calculating
solvency capital requirements (SCRs) for pure endowments and annuities issued to
mixed portfolios. The main theoretical result is that, if the unisex fairness principle
is adopted for the unisex premium, the SCR at issuing time of the mixed portfolio
calculated with unisex survival probabilities is greater than the sum of the SCRs of
the gender-based subportfolios. Numerical results show that for pure endowments the
gap between the two is negligible, but for lifetime annuities the gap can be as high
as 3-4%. We also analyze some conservative pricing procedures that deviate from the
unisex fairness principle, and nd that they lead to SCRs that are lower than the sum
of the gender-based SCRs, because the policyholders are overcharged at issuing time.
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1 Introduction and motivation
There have been two major changes for insurers operating in the life insurance markets in
the European Union since the start of the new millennium.
The rst major change is the regulation on gender discrimination, also well known as
the EU Gender Directive (Aseervatham et al., 2016).1 This norm establishes that insur-
ance products must be oered at the same price for men and women. Responding to this
change, there appears some academic literature addressing the unisex insurance (pricing)
practice. For instance, Guillen (2012) indicates that gender information shall be taken into
consideration when analyzing the insurance companies' data and risk, despite the ban on
the gender discrimination on price. Ornelas and Guillen (2013) compare Mexican unisex
life tables that are used for insurance purposes with those of the general population. Sass
and Seifried (2014) analyze the eects of mandatory unisex taris on the optimal insurance
demand. Schmeiser et al. (2014) discuss unisex insurance pricing also from the regulator's
perspective and Thiery and Van Schoubroeck (2006) deal with the legal aspects of fairness
and equality in actuarial risk selection. Chen and Vigna (2017) show how insurance compa-
nies can price a portfolio of policies issued to males and females of the same age if they want
to respect actuarial fairness at the portfolio level, and they introduce the unisex mortality
intensity that is in accordance with the fairness principle.
The second major change in the European context is that capital requirements are now
highly regulated with the implementation of the Solvency II directive. The magnitude of the
Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is of high relevance, because it restricts the nancial
capacity of a company.
In the present paper, we investigate the implications of the adoption of the unisex fairness
principle on the solvency capital requirement, particularly the initial SCR. Taking pure
1In the remainder of the paper we will refer to the EU Gender Directive, however, the results apply to
similar no-gender discrimination rules anywhere in the world. Indeed, the analysis of gender equalization
is relevant not only to the European context. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court rst prohibited
gender-based divisions in insurance in the case City of Los Angeles. In 1983, the courts banned gender-based
insurance distinctions for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans in Arizona. Insurance
companies have opposed any legislation that restrict their ability to use gender-based distinctions in devel-
oping insurance classications, rates and coverages, but ghting discrimination is on the agenda of social
movements all over the world.
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endowments and life annuities as examples, we compute the initial SCR per policy relying
on a single \unisex" portfolio and satisfying the initial actuarial fairness principle (Chen
and Vigna (2017)); and we compare it with the weighted average of the gender-based per
policy SCRs. For these life insurance contracts, we show that the SCR at issuing time of
the mixed portfolio calculated with unisex survival probabilities is greater than the sum of
the SCRs of the gender-based subportfolios. Moreover, we analyze how the gap between the
capital requirements calculated under the two approaches depends on the size of the shock
on mortality, on the compositional balance between men and women, and on the type of life
insurance products.
An illustration is presented with the mortality experience for the 1950 cohort of men
and women in the United Kingdom. The numerical analysis justies our main theoretical
result that the initial SCR relying on a single \unisex" portfolio is higher than the weighted
one. However, the dierence in the SCR between these two approaches is negligible for pure
endowments, and it becomes more substantial for life annuities products. Despite its very
stylized nature, our model suggests that insurers should perform internal actuarial analysis
with survival tables that distinguish between men and women. To the best of their interests,
this leads to a more accurate risk analysis and, interestingly, under some conditions, to a
smaller solvency capital compared to the case where information on sex is deleted from their
les and no specic analysis by gender-group is done.
In the paper, we also discuss some approaches to computing the unisex taris and the
SCRs used in practice. Apparently, insurers sometimes deviate from the unisex fairness
principle. They either use the price of the riskier gender for all policyholders, or they use
a weighted mix of the gender-based survival rates and add an extra-loading to it. When
such practices are adopted, insurers are overcharging policyholders. Due to the excessive
premiums, they need a smaller capital requirement than what the adoption of the unisex fair
premium would imply. Some policy-oriented recommendations are given in the conclusions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the unisex fairness principle
and its implications on the fair premium. Section 3 presents the main theoretical results on
the SCR. Section 4 introduces the stochastic mortality model. Section 5 shows numerical
applications. Section 6 shows the consequences of some alternative practices. The last
section concludes.
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2 Unisex fairness principle and implications
In this section, we report the main results in Chen and Vigna (2017), recalling the denition
of unisex fairness principle.
Suppose that the insurance company issues a portfolio of identical policies to m males and
n females with same age x. This portfolio will be called a mixed portfolio in the following.
Since the EU Gender Directive, the price to be charged is the same for males and females,
say P u. Assume that the fair price for the males before the EU Gender Directive was Pm,
calculated according to the males' mortality table
[pmx ; p
m
x+1; :::; p
m
! 1]; (1)
where ! is the maximal allowed age, and that the fair price for the females before the EU
Gender Directive was P f , calculated according to the females' mortality table
[pfx; p
f
x+1; :::; p
f
! 1]: (2)
Before the EU Gender Directive, the mixed portfolio consisted of two subportfolios, the rst
one with m males and price Pm, the second one with n females and price P f . The total
amount of premiums collected before the EU Gender Directive was
m  Pm + n  P f : (3)
After the EU Gender Directive, in order to respect the actuarial fairness at the global
portfolio level, the insurer should collect the amount in (3), therefore
(m+ n)  P u = m  Pm + n  P f :
This is formalized in the denition of unisex fairness principle and unisex fair premium:
Denition 2.1 (Unisex fairness principle and unisex fair premium). For a given portfolio
of m male policyholders and n female policyholders, whose fair premiums are Pm and P f
respectively, we say that the unisex tari P u is calculated according to the unisex fairness
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principle if
P u =   Pm + (1  )  P f ; (4)
where
 =
m
m+ n
2 [0; 1]: (5)
In this case, the unisex tari P u is called unisex fair premium.
The actuarial fairness for the mixed portfolio can be achieved only by charging the unisex
fair premium, whose amount depends only on the fair prices for males and females and on
the proportion of each gender in the mixed portfolio. Obviously, when there are no females
in the portfolio,  = 1 and P u = Pm; when there are no males in the portfolio,  = 0 and
P u = P f . Similarly, if Pm = P f , then P u = Pm = P f independent of .
A legitimate question one can have is: How should unisex survival probabilities look like
in order to produce a unisex price that is fair? The answer depends on the insurance product
issued. We shall address this issue separately for two important life insurance products: pure
endowment and lifetime annuity.
Pure endowment
The fair prices of a pure endowment insurance contract with a duration T and a unitary
payment issued to a male and a female aged x are, respectively,
Pm =T E
m
x =T p
m
x e
 rT and P f =T Efx =T p
f
x e
 rT ;
where r is the risk-free rate and e rT is the nancial discount factor from T to 0. According
to (4), we have:
P u =T E
u
x =T p
u
x e
 rT (6)
where
Tp
u
x = Tp
m
x + (1  )Tpfx: (7)
The interpretation of (6)-(7) is rather important. For the pure endowment, the unisex
fair premium is equal to the fair premium issued to a policyholder whose T -years survival
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probability is a weighted average of the T -years survival probabilities of males and females,
the weights being the proportions of males and females in the portfolio.
Lifetime annuity
The fair prices of a continuous unitary lifetime annuity issued to a male and a female aged
x are, respectively,2
Pm = amx =
 ! x
0
tp
m
x e
 rtdt and P f = afx =
 ! x
0
tp
f
x e
 rtdt:
According to (4), we have:
P u = aux =
 ! x
0
tp
u
x e
 rtdt (8)
where
tp
u
x =  tp
m
x + (1  )tpfx for all t  !   x: (9)
For the lifetime annuity, the unisex fair premium is equal to the fair premium issued to a
policyholder whose t-years survival probability is a weighted average of the t-year survival
probabilities of males and females for all t  !   x, the weights being the proportions of
males and females in the portfolio.
2.1 Adverse selection issues
The introduction of the EU Gender Directive can cause the presence of additional adverse
selection. We here provide a short discussion of this problem. Sass and Seifried (2014) dis-
cuss this problem extensively.
Assume that at time 0, two x-aged potential investors (a female and a male) with an
amount ofW respectively are interested in investing in the annuity products. Both investors
2This product is similar to immediate lifetime annuity product in Milevsky and Salisbury (2015). Unlike
Milevsky and Salisbury (2015) where the optimal annuity payo is determined, we are more interested in
the solvency capital requirement related to these products.
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compare the investment in the annuity product with other alternatives in the nancial mar-
ket. Assume both of them are risk averse and have respectively a utility function of ui(y),
i = m; f , u0i(y) > 0 and u
00
i (y) < 0. Assume further that the most attractive alternative in
the market provides both investors a utility of U iInvestment.
Assume that two dierent pension annuity factors (two dierent prices of continuous
unitary annuity payments) are provided to the female and male investors, i.e.
aix =
 ! x
0
tp
i
xe
 rtdt; i = m; f:
With these prices, the female and male investor will obtain a continuous pension annuity
payment of W=afx and W=a
m
x respectively. Assume that in this case, with dierentiated
pricing (due to the dierent survival probabilities for male and female) and the resulting
payments, both of the investors will invest in the annuity products rather than in the al-
ternative products in the nancial market, because the annuity product provides a higher
utility, i.e.
U iAnnuity =
 ! x
0
tp
i
xui(W=a
i
x)dt > U
i
Investment i = m; f:
If instead the insurance company applies a fair unisex tari to the annuity products, i.e. in
this case, aux =
 ! x
0
e rt(1
2 t
pmx +
1
2 t
pfx)dt, then the lifetime utility for the female increases to
U fAnnuityjunisex =
 ! x
0
tp
f
xuf (W=a
u
x)dt > U
f
Annuity > U
f
Investment
due to the increasing utility function and the fact afx > a
u
x. In other words, the female still
decides for the annuity product. In contrast, the lifetime utility of the male investor becomes
now
UmAnnuityjunisex =
 ! x
0
tp
m
x um(W=a
u
x)dt:
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As amx < a
u
x and we assume an increasing utility function, it could happen that
UmAnnuityjunisex =
 ! x
0
tp
m
x um(W=a
u
x)dt < U
m
Investment <
 ! x
0
tp
m
x um(W=a
m
x )dt = U
m
Annuity:
If this scenario happens, the good risk (male investor) will decide for the alternative invest-
ment instead of investing in the annuity product.
3 General results on SCR
3.1 Standard calculation of SCR
In order to see how the unisex actuarial fairness impacts on the solvency capital requirement,
we consider both the pure endowment and the lifetime annuity products introduced in the
last section.
Generally, the amount of regulatory capital required by Solvency II standards is consistent
with a Value-at-Risk assessment at a 99.5% condence interval on a one year time horizon,
see also EIOPA (2014). In Olivieri and Pitacco (2009) and Borger (2010), there are several
denitions for the capital charge for the longevity risk. Following them, we choose to dene
the initial solvency capital requirement for one single policy as
SCRi(0) = BELi;shock(0) BELi(0); i = m; f; u; (10)
where BELi;shock(0) is the best estimate liability value at time 0 under a longevity shock, and
BELi(0) is the best estimate liability value used in the net premium charging. The SCRi(0)
measures the buer that has to be set aside because future benets could change due to
an evolution of mortality experience that is dierent from that assumed in the calculation
of the premium charged. According to Solvency II, insurers are required to assume that a
longevity shock will reduce the annual death probabilities by 20%. Returning to the pure
endowments and life annuity products considered in the previous section, we obtain for pure
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endowments:
BELi(0) = P iend(0) = S
i(0; T )e rT ; i = m; f; u; (11)
where Si(0; T ) is the survival probability from 0 to T for a policyholder of gender i. Note
that Si(0; T ) is the standard notation for the survival function in continuous-time models:
it is the equivalent of Tp
i
x for the survival probability at T for a policyholder aged x used in
the previous section. For the continuous lifetime annuity products:
BELi(0) = P iann(0) =
 ! x
0
Si(0; s)e rsds; i = m; f; u; (12)
where Si(0; s) is the survival probability from 0 to s for a policyholder of gender i.
In the following, we need to nd a way of introducing the longevity shock in order to
obtain the shocked survival probabilities Si;shock(0; T ), i = m; f; u, where the superscript
shock stands for longevity shock. Hereby, we follow the approach of Lin and Cox (2005)
and, for a given cohort x, the survival probabilities (for all t > 0) are simultaneously shocked.
More specically, we assume
Si;shock(0; T ) = (Si(0; T ))1 ; i = m; f; u; (13)
where  2 [0; 1] is a constant.
3.1.1 SCR for pure endowment and lifetime annuity
Applying the denition of the SCR per policy in (10) and the shocked survival probability
as in (13) to the pure endowment, we obtain
SCRiend(; 0; T ) =

Si;shock(0; T )  Si(0; T ) e rT
=

(Si(0; T ))1    Si(0; T ) e rT ; i = m; f; u: (14)
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Applying the denition of the SCR in (10) and the shocked survival probability as in (13)
to the annuity, we obtain
SCRiann(; 0) =
 ! x
0

Si;shock(0; s)  Si(0; s) e rsds
=
 ! x
0

(Si(0; s))1    Si(0; s) e rsds; i = m; f; u: (15)
We notice from (14) that, for a xed interest rate r > 0, the initial SCR at time 0 for the
pure endowment with duration T is a function of two variables: the shock  2 [0; 1], and the
duration T . Similarly, we see from (15) that the initial SCR at time 0 for the lifetime annuity
is a function of the shock  2 [0; 1]. In the following, we will need to use the dependence
of SCR on the dierent variables, and it is therefore important to highlight it. However,
the complete notation with the dependence of SCR() on two variables is heavy and often
unnecessary. For notational convenience, in the rest of the paper, we will sometimes adopt
the following simplied notations:
SCRiend T () :=SCR
i
end(; 0; T ) (16)
SCRiann() :=SCR
i
ann(; 0) (17)
SCRiend(; ) :=SCR
i
end(; 0; ) (18)
In other words, we suppress 0 from the arguments of SCR() and leave SCR() as a function
of  (and possibly ) only, see (16), (18), (17); when the duration of the pure endowment T
does not change, we just report it in the subscript, see (16); when the duration of the pure
endowment  does change, we leave it as an argument of SCR(), see (18).
3.2 General results
This section is the mathematical core of the paper. We prove that for the pure endowment
and the annuity the adoption of the unisex fairness principle implies that the solvency cap-
ital requirement at issuing time of the mixed portfolio calculated with the unisex survival
probability is greater than or equal to the weighted sum of the solvency capital requirements
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of the two gender-based subportfolios. Here we consider the solvency capital requirement
as calculated at time 0; accordingly, and following the notation of Section 3.1.1, the SCR is
modeled as a function of  (and possibly ) only.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that a portfolio of m+ n pure endowments with duration T and
sum assured M = 1 issued to m males and n females aged x is priced according to the unisex
fairness principle. Assume that the solvency capital requirement at time 0 is calculated
according to
SCRiend T () = e
 rT
h 
Six(T )
1    Six(T )i for i = u;m; f; (19)
where Six(T ) is the T -years pre-shock survival probability for age x and gender i = u;m; f ,
and  2 [0; 1]. Then, the SCR at time 0 for a unisex policyholder is greater than or equal to
the weighted average of the SCRs at time 0 for male and female:
SCRuend T ()  SCRmend T () + (1  )SCRfend T () 8  2 [0; 1] (20)
where
 =
m
m+ n
2 [0; 1]
is the proportion of males in the portfolio. Assuming that Smx (T ) 6= Sfx (T ), then the inequality
in (20) is strict if and only if  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1).
Proof. Let us dene the function h():
h() = SCRuend T () 

SCRmend T () + (1  )SCRfend T ()

: (21)
Claim (20) is equivalent to the non-negativity of the function h(). From (19) and (21) (for
notational convenience, in the following we will write Si in the place of Six(T )) we have:
h()erT = (Su)1    Su  

 (Sm)1    Sm + (1  )  Sf1    (1  )Sf :
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Due to the unisex fairness principle, the relationship (7) holds true:
Su = Sm + (1  )Sf : (22)
By simplifying, we have
h()erT = (Su)1   

 (Sm)1  + (1  )  Sf1  : (23)
Let us dene the function f():
f(x) = x1 
Then, due to (22), (23) becomes:
h()erT = f
 
Sm + (1  )Sf  f(Sm)  (1  )f(Sf )  0
where the inequality results from applying the Jensen's inequality to the concave function
f(x) for  2 [0; 1]. Hence, the claim (20) is proven. If  = 0 (or  = 1) there are no males
(or females) in the mixed portfolio, and the inequality becomes an equality. If  = 0, then
SCRiend T = 0 for all i = u;m; f and the equality holds; if  = 1, the function f(x) is linear
and the equality holds. If  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), then the function f(x) is strictly concave
and the inequality in (20) is strict.
The same result holds as a corollary also for the annuity case. In the following corollary
we use the fact that the annuity is the union of pure endowments with dierent durations,
and adopt the notation introduced in (18).
Corollary 3.2. Assume that a portfolio of m+ n lifetime annuities with a unitary payment
issued to m males and n females aged x is priced according to the unisex fairness principle.
Assume that the solvency capital requirement at time 0 is calculated according to
SCRiann() =
 ! x
0
h 
Six()
1    Six()i e rd =  ! x
0
SCRiend(; )d for i = u;m; f;
(24)
where Six(t) is the t-years pre-shock survival probability for age x and gender i = u;m; f ,
SCRiend(; ) is the solvency capital requirement at time 0 for a pure endowment duration  ,
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and  2 [0; 1]. Then, the SCR at time 0 for a unisex policyholder is greater than or equal to
the volume-related weighted average of the SCRs at time 0 for male and female:
SCRuann()  SCRmann() + (1  )SCRfann() 8  2 [0; 1] (25)
where
 =
m
m+ n
2 [0; 1]
is the proportion of males in the portfolio. Assuming that Smx () 6= Sfx () for all  , then the
inequality in (25) is strict if and only if  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1).
In the corollary we set c(t) = 1 for simplicity, but the extension to the general payment
c(t) is straightforward.
Proof. Using (24), we have
SCRuann() 
 
SCRmann() + (1  )SCRfann()

= (26) ! x
0
h
SCRuend(; )  SCRmend(; )  (1  )SCRfend(; )
i
d  0; (27)
where the inequality is due to the fact that, by Proposition 3.1, the integrand function is
positive. The other claims follow easily.
Remark 1. Notice that the results of Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 hold only at time
0, or issuing time. In general, they do not hold at time t > 0. Indeed, the unisex fairness
principle holds only at issuing time. The reason behind it is that we have used the initial
unisex fairness principle in our derivation. This fairness principle can be violated in future
time t > 0.
Remark 2. Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 remark the impact of the EU Gender Directive
on the value of the SCR at issuing time. Indeed, before the EU Gender Directive, the SCR
was calculated separately on the two subportfolios and the aggregate SCR was
mSCRm + nSCRf = (m+ n)SCRweighted
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where
SCRweighted = SCRm + (1  )SCRf : (28)
After the EU Gender Directive, the insurer can still calculate the SCR in the old way with
the two subportfolios. But if, instead, he prefers to calculate the SCR considering a single
mixed portfolio with m + n unisex policyholders (maybe because of scal incentives),3 he
should calculate (m + n)SCRu. Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 compare the SCR at
issuing time calculated with the two dierent procedures.
In Section 4 we introduce a stochastic mortality model, and in Section 5 we calibrate it
and calculate the dierence between the unisex SCR, SCRu, and the weighted sum of the
gender-based SCRs as in (28). This illustrates the practical implications of the results just
proven.
4 The stochastic mortality model
In this section we review the stochastic unisex mortality model introduced in Chen and Vigna
(2017). Let us introduce a complete ltered probability space (
;F;P) and a ltration Ft
of sub--algebras representing the state of information at time 0  t  T . An insurance
company manages a mixed portfolio with m male policyholders and n female policyholders
with the same age x. For notational convenience, throughout this section we omit the
dependence on x of the mortality processes. We describe the stochastic force of mortality
of each gender as an ane process . In other words, the time of death is modelled as the
rst jump time of a doubly stochastic process with intensity  (see, Bis, 2005; Dahl, 2004;
Due et al., 2000; Luciano and Vigna, 2008; Milevsky and Promislow, 2001). In particular,
the stochastic mortality intensity m of males and the stochastic mortality intensity f of
females are described by two dierent Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (OU processes) with
positive drift and no mean reversion:
dm(t) =m
m(t)dt+ mdW
m(t);
df (t) =f
f (t)dt+ fdW
f (t); (29)
3In some countries like Denmark insurers receive scal incentives if they merge the two subportfolios.
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where i > 0 and i > 0 for i = m; f , and Wm and Wf are two standard Brownian motions
under the real world measure P, correlated with a correlation coecient . The OU process
for the mortality intensity is a natural stochastic generalization of the Gompertz law for the
force of mortality and is introduced by Luciano and Vigna (2008), where the conditions for
its biological reasonableness are also analysed. The survival probability function of males
and females can be expressed in closed-form (see, Luciano and Vigna, 2008):
Si(t; T ) =E

exp

 
 T
t
i(u)du
 Ft = expi() + i()i(t)	 ; i = f;m (30)
i() =
2i
22i
   
2
i
3i
ei +
2i
43i
e2i +
32i
43i
; i = f;m
i() =
1
i
(1  ei ); i = f;m
where  := T   t.
Chen and Vigna (2017) model the mortality intensity of a representative unisex policyholder
of the mixed portfolio as a weighted average of the males' and females' mortality intensities,
and provide the following denition:
Denition 4.1 (Unisex mortality intensity). For a mixed portfolio of male and female pol-
icyholders, whose stochastic mortality intensities are m and f respectively, we dene the
-driven unisex mortality intensity by mixing the male and female intensities with the weight
 2 [0; 1]:
u (t) = 
m(t) + (1  )f (t): (31)
Chen and Vigna (2017) nd the survival probability of a unisex policyholder whose
mortality intensity is given by (31) (for simplicity, in the following the subscript  in the
functions , 1 and 2 is omitted):
Proposition 4.2. Conditional on t, the survival probability for the remaining time  = T t
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related to the mixed mortality intensity u in (31) is given by
Su(t; T ) =E

exp

 
 T
t
u (s)ds
 Ft
=E

exp

 
 T
t
m(s)ds 
 T
t
(1  )f (s)ds
 Ft
=exp
n
u() + 1;u()
m(t) + 2;u()
f (t)
o
; (32)
with
1;u() =

m
(1  em ); (33)
2;u() =
1  
f
(1  ef  ); (34)
and
u() =
2m
2
43m

(em   2)2 + 2m   1

+
2f (   1)2
43f

(ef    2)2 + 2f   1

(35)
  mf(   1)
2m
2
f (m + f )
n
2m(1  ef  ) + 2f (1  em ) + mf [(1  em )(1  ef  ) + (m + f ) ]
o
Proof. Proof can be found in Chen and Vigna (2017).
Finally, among the innitely many possible weights  2 [0; 1] of the family (31), Chen and
Vigna (2017) identify the critical weight  that generates the fair unisex premium. Noting
that the fair premium of a life insurance product is a function () of the mortality intensity
of the insured:
P i = (i) for i = u;m; f;
the identication of the correct weight  can be formalized by the following denition:
Denition 4.3 (Fair unisex mortality intensity). For a given portfolio of m male policy-
holders and n female policyholders, whose fair gender-based premiums are Pm = (m) and
P f = (f ) respectively, we say that u is a fair unisex mortality intensity if the corre-
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sponding unisex premium
P u = (u) = (
m + (1  )f )
is fair, i.e., it satises the unisex fairness principle (4):
(m + (1  )f ) =   (m) + (1  )  (f ); (36)
where  = m=(m+ n), and  is called the fair mortality mixing parameter.
5 Numerical application
5.1 Calibration of UK cohort born in 1950
In this section, we calibrate the mortality model presented in Section 4 and, in the presence
of the unisex fairness principle, we investigate the magnitude of the gap between the SCR
calculated with the fair unisex mortality intensity and the weighted average of the SCRs of
the two subportfolios of males and females. For the calibration of the gender-based mortality
intensities, we take data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD hereafter) University of
California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany)
(2002) (data downloaded on: 06-May-2013) and consider the males and females born in 1950
in UK, initial age 35. We adopt the same calibration procedure used in Chen and Vigna
(2017) and review the calibration procedure shortly.
For the cohort of initial age x = 35 and each gender i = m; f we have extrapolated from
the HMD twenty observed survival probabilities tp^
i
x, t = 1; :::; 20; then, we have calibrated
the values of the parameters m, f , m, f that appear in the theoretical survival functions
Smx (0; t) and S
f
x (0; t) given by (30) by minimizing the following mean square error
1
20
20X
t=1
 
tp^
i
x   Six(0; t)
2
for i = m; f . In all cases, the value of the initial observed intensity ix(0) is set equal to
17
  ln p^ix. Table 1 reports the calibrated values of the parameters for the male and female
generations 1950.
Table 1: Calibrated values and errors for males and females of cohort 1950 (initial age 35).
Female Male
x(0) 0.00075028 0.00112463
x 0.08001563 0.08171875
x 0.00010305 0.00011789
Calibration Error 0.00000006 0.00000007
5.2 Fair  and SCR
In this section, we focus on three products (i) pure endowment 20 years, (ii) pure endowment
30 years and (iii) lifetime annuity, which are sold to men and women. We assume that the age
at inception of the policy is 35 for the pure endowments and 65 for the annuity. Assuming an
interest rate r = 0:03 and  = 0:95,4 we have calculated  with portfolio gender composition
 ranging from  = 0:10 to  = 0:90. The fair  values are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Fair  for pure endowment (PE) and lifetime annuity with parameters:  = 0:95,
r = 0:03, generation born in 1950, initial age 35 and maximal allowed age ! = 110.
 = m
m+n
PE, T = 20 PE, T = 30 Lifetime annuity
0.10 0.0991 0.0976 0.0836
0.25 0.2481 0.2445 0.2154
0.50 0.4974 0.4932 0.4527
0.75 0.7481 0.7449 0.7137
0.90 0.8991 0.8975 0.8823
Then, we have calculated the unisex SCR and the weighted average of SCRs of males
and females for all the products with a variety of shocks  and a variety of portfolio gender
compositions . In particular, using the notation of Section 3.1.1, for
4Chen and Vigna (2017) make sensitivity analysis with respect to  and nd that results are almost
insensitive to changes in .
18
 products z = end-20; end-30; ann
 shocks  = 0; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9; 1:
 portfolio gender-compositions  = 0; 0:1; 0:25; 0:5; 0:75; 0:9; 1,
we have calculated:
 SCRuz ()
 SCRweightedz () = SCRmz () + (1  )SCRfz ()
 their absolute dierence SCRuz ()  SCRweightedz ()
 their relative dierence (SCRuz ()  SCRweightedz ())=SCRuz ()
The main results are displayed in Tables 3 and 4.
19
T
ab
le
3:
S
C
R
es
ti
m
at
io
n
fo
r
u
n
is
ex
S
C
R
u z
(
)
(l
ef
t)
an
d
w
ei
gh
te
d
su
b
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
S
C
R
w
ei
g
h
te
d
z
(
)
(r
ig
h
t)
,
fo
r
va
ry
in
g
p
ro
p
or
ti
on
(
)
m
al
e/
fe
m
al
e
an
d
sh
o
ck
(
).
P
u
re
-e
n
d
ow
m
en
t
20
-y
ea
rs



0%
10
%
25
%
50
%
75
%
90
%
10
0%

0%
10
%
25
%
50
%
75
%
90
%
10
0%
0.
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0
.0
03
0.
00
3
0.
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0
.0
06
0.
00
6
0.
3
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
0.
00
9
0.
3
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
0
.0
09
0.
00
9
0.
4
0.
00
8
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
0.
01
0
0.
01
1
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
0.
4
0.
00
8
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
0.
01
0
0.
01
1
0
.0
11
0.
01
2
0.
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
0.
01
4
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
0.
01
4
0
.0
14
0.
01
5
0.
6
0.
01
2
0.
01
2
0.
01
3
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0.
01
7
0.
01
8
0.
6
0.
01
2
0.
01
2
0.
01
3
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0
.0
17
0.
01
8
0.
7
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0.
01
7
0.
01
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
1
0.
7
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0.
01
7
0.
01
9
0
.0
20
0.
02
1
0.
8
0.
01
6
0.
01
7
0.
01
8
0.
02
0
0.
02
2
0.
02
3
0.
02
4
0.
8
0.
01
6
0.
01
7
0.
01
8
0.
02
0
0.
02
2
0
.0
23
0.
02
4
0.
9
0.
01
8
0.
01
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
3
0.
02
5
0.
02
6
0.
02
7
0.
9
0.
01
8
0.
01
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
3
0.
02
5
0
.0
26
0.
02
7
1.
0
0.
02
0
0.
02
1
0.
02
3
0.
02
5
0.
02
8
0.
02
9
0.
03
0
1.
0
0.
02
0
0.
02
1
0.
02
3
0.
02
5
0.
02
8
0
.0
29
0.
03
0
P
u
re
-e
n
d
ow
m
en
t
30
-y
ea
rs



0%
10
%
25
%
50
%
75
%
90
%
10
0%

0%
10
%
25
%
50
%
75
%
90
%
10
0%
0.
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0
.0
05
0.
00
5
0.
2
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
01
0
0.
2
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
0.
01
0
0
.0
10
0.
01
0
0.
3
0.
01
1
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
0.
01
3
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0.
3
0.
01
1
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
0.
01
3
0.
01
4
0
.0
15
0.
01
6
0.
4
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0.
01
8
0.
01
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
1
0.
4
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
0.
01
8
0.
01
9
0
.0
20
0.
02
1
0.
5
0.
01
8
0.
01
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
2
0.
02
4
0.
02
6
0.
02
7
0.
5
0.
01
8
0.
01
9
0.
02
0
0.
02
2
0.
02
4
0
.0
26
0.
02
7
0.
6
0.
02
1
0.
02
2
0.
02
4
0.
02
7
0.
02
9
0.
03
1
0.
03
2
0.
6
0.
02
1
0.
02
2
0.
02
4
0.
02
7
0.
02
9
0
.0
31
0.
03
2
0.
7
0.
02
5
0.
02
6
0.
02
8
0.
03
1
0.
03
5
0.
03
6
0.
03
8
0.
7
0.
02
5
0.
02
6
0.
02
8
0.
03
1
0.
03
5
0
.0
36
0.
03
8
0.
8
0.
02
9
0.
03
0
0.
03
2
0.
03
6
0.
04
0
0.
04
2
0.
04
3
0.
8
0.
02
9
0.
03
0
0.
03
2
0.
03
6
0.
04
0
0
.0
42
0.
04
3
0.
9
0.
03
3
0.
03
4
0.
03
7
0.
04
1
0.
04
5
0.
04
7
0.
04
9
0.
9
0.
03
3
0.
03
4
0.
03
7
0.
04
1
0.
04
5
0
.0
47
0.
04
9
1.
0
0.
03
6
0.
03
8
0.
04
1
0.
04
6
0.
05
0
0.
05
3
0.
05
5
1.
0
0.
03
6
0.
03
8
0.
04
1
0.
04
6
0.
05
0
0
.0
53
0.
05
5
A
n
n
u
it
y



0%
10
%
25
%
50
%
75
%
90
%
10
0%

0%
10
%
25
%
50
%
75
%
90
%
10
0%
0.
1
0.
50
7
0.
51
2
0.
51
9
0.
52
4
5.
52
2
0.
51
6
0.
51
0
0.
1
0.
50
7
0.
50
7
0.
50
8
0.
50
9
0.
50
9
0
.5
10
0.
51
0
0.
2
1.
06
8
1.
08
0
1.
09
4
1.
10
8
1.
10
5
1.
09
3
1.
07
9
0.
2
1.
06
8
1.
06
9
1.
07
1
1.
07
3
1.
07
6
1
.0
78
1.
07
9
0.
3
1.
69
5
1.
71
5
1.
74
0
1.
75
4
1.
76
3
1.
74
4
1.
72
1
0.
3
1.
69
5
1.
69
8
1.
70
1
1.
70
8
1.
71
4
1
.7
18
1.
72
1
0.
4
2.
40
2
2.
43
2
2.
04
7
2.
51
2
2.
51
6
2.
49
2
2.
45
6
0.
4
2.
40
2
2.
40
7
2.
41
5
2.
42
9
2.
44
3
2
.4
51
2.
45
6
0.
5
3.
20
8
3.
25
2
3.
30
9
3.
37
5
3.
39
1
3.
36
4
3.
31
6
0.
5
3.
20
8
3.
21
9
3.
23
5
3.
26
2
3.
28
9
3
.3
05
3.
31
6
0.
6
4.
13
9
4.
20
1
4.
28
4
4.
38
7
4.
42
8
4.
40
3
4.
34
3
0.
6
4.
13
9
4.
16
0
4.
19
0
4.
24
1
4.
29
2
4
.3
23
4.
34
3
0.
7
5.
23
0
5.
31
7
5.
43
5
5.
59
4
5.
68
2
5.
67
3
5.
60
9
0.
7
5.
23
0
5.
26
8
5.
32
5
5.
42
0
5.
51
4
5
.5
71
5.
60
9
0.
8
6.
52
8
6.
64
8
6.
81
8
7.
06
3
7.
23
6
7.
27
2
7.
22
4
0.
8
6.
52
8
6.
59
7
6.
70
2
6.
87
6
7.
05
0
7
.1
55
7.
22
4
0.
9
8.
09
5
8.
26
3
8.
50
7
8.
88
7
9.
21
1
9.
35
0
9.
37
7
0.
9
8.
09
5
8.
22
3
8.
41
6
8.
73
6
9.
05
6
9
.2
48
9.
37
7
1.
0
10
.0
21
10
.2
57
10
.6
11
11
.2
02
11
.7
93
12
.1
47
12
.3
84
1.
0
10
.0
21
10
.2
57
10
.6
11
11
.2
02
11
.7
9
3
1
2
.1
47
12
.3
84
20
From Tables 3 and 4 we can observe what follows:
1. As expected from Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, for all life insurance products, all
 and all , SCRu is greater or equal than SCRweighted. When  is 0 or 1, and when
 is 0 or 1, there is no dierence between SCRu and SCRweighted, and their gap is 0.
For the pure endowment products, in all cases the dierences are smaller than 0:001
so they cannot be appreciated from Table 3. However, the dierence is non-negligible
for the annuity product.
2. For all  and  both the absolute gap SCRu SCRweighted and the relative gap (SCRu 
SCRweighted)=SCRu are lowest for pure endowment 20 years, slightly higher for pure
endowment 30 years, highest for the annuity. In all cases, the relative gap is bigger
than the absolute gap, because the denominator SCRu is lower than one. The order of
magnitude of the relative gap is negligible for the pure endowment for both durations,
reaching a maximum of 0.25% for pure endowment with 30 years, with  = 0:1 and
 = 0:5. The order of magnitude of the relative gap is more important for the annuity
case, reaching a maximum of 3.35% for  = 0:5 and  = 0:5.
3. Dependence on  of SCRu and SCRweighted. Interestingly, for all products, in most
cases when  is xed, both SCRu and SCRweighted increase when  increases. This
is apparently counterintuitive, if one thinks that  = 0 means a portfolio consisting
of females and  = 1 means a portfolio consisting of males only. Because females
are riskier than males for pure endowment and annuity products, one would expect
a greater solvency capital requirement for females than for males. But this can be
explained observing that by denition the SCR is the dierence between what insurers
should pay in case of distorted higher survival probabilities and what insurers have
already set aside in the reserves with the single premium, see (10). Indeed, let us
consider, for simplicity the SCR at time 0 for the pure endowment case for gender i:
SCRiend T () = e
 rT  Si(T )1    Si(T ) = e rTSi(T )1    i
where i is the fair price for gender i. Obviously, the fact that Sm(T ) < Sf (T )
produces Sm(T )1  < Sf (T )1 , and therefore the amount to be paid in absolute terms
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Table 4: Relative dierence when comparing unisex vs. weighted approach for SCR, for
varying proportion () male/female and shock ().
Pure-endowment 20-years 
 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
0.1 0.00% 0.04% 0.08% 0.09% 0.06% 0.03% 0.00%
0.2 0.00% 0.04% 0.07% 0.08% 0.06% 0.03% 0.00%
0.3 0.00% 0.03% 0.06% 0.07% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00%
0.4 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 0.00%
0.5 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.02% 0.00%
0.6 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00%
0.7 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00%
0.8 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
0.9 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
1.0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Pure-endowment 30-years 
 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
0.1 0.00% 0.11% 0.21% 0.25% 0.18% 0.08% 0.00%
0.2 0.00% 0.10% 0.19% 0.23% 0.16% 0.07% 0.00%
0.3 0.00% 0.08% 0.17% 0.20% 0.14% 0.06% 0.00%
0.4 0.00% 0.07% 0.14% 0.17% 0.12% 0.05% 0.00%
0.5 0.00% 0.06% 0.12% 0.14% 0.10% 0.05% 0.00%
0.6 0.00% 0.05% 0.10% 0.12% 0.08% 0.04% 0.00%
0.7 0.00% 0.04% 0.07% 0.09% 0.06% 0.03% 0.00%
0.8 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 0.00%
0.9 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00%
1.0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Annuity 
 0% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
0.1 0.00% 0.98% 2.09% 2.98% 2.48% 1.31% 0.00%
0.2 0.00% 1.00% 2.15% 3.09% 2.62% 1.41% 0.00%
0.3 0.00% 1.01% 2.19% 3.21% 2.77% 1.52% 0.00%
0.4 0.00% 1.02% 2.23% 3.30% 2.91% 1.63% 0.00%
0.5 0.00% 1.02% 2.23% 3.35% 3.03% 1.74% 0.00%
0.6 0.00% 0.99% 2.18% 3.32% 3.07% 1.82% 0.00%
0.7 0.00% 0.91% 2.03% 3.12% 2.96% 1.80% 0.00%
0.8 0.00% 0.76% 1.70% 2.65% 2.57% 1.61% 0.00%
0.9 0.00% 0.48% 1.08% 1.70% 1.68% 1.08% 0.00%
1.0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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with a distorted survival probability is higher for females than for males; however, in
the SCR we have to subtract the fair premium i = e rTSi(T ) that for the females is
higher than for the males. Thus, if the fair premium for females is higher than the fair
premium for males, and if the latter is higher than 0:35 (which happens to be the case
for pure endowment 20 or 30 years issued to 35-years old policyholder), then we have:5
Sf (T )1    Sf (T ) < Sm(T )1    Sm(T ) ) SCRfend T () < SCRmend T ()
In all intermediate situations, when  2 (0; 1) we have
SCRfend T () < SCR
m
end T () + (1  )SCRmend T () < SCRmend T ()
that explains the increasing SCR with , both for the unisex case and the weighted
case. This explanation holds for the pure endowment only, and in fact for the annuity
in some cases SCRu does not increase with .
4. Dependence on  of absolute and relative gap of SCRu and SCRweighted. When  is
xed, the maximum relative gap is with  = 0:5 for all products considered. This is
consistent with intuition: the most unfair situation is when the portfolio is perfectly
balanced in terms of males and females. As a degenerate case, when there is only one
gender in the portfolio, the unisex price is the gender-based fair price, and the EU
Gender Directive does not impact the price and the SCR. When there is a majority
of one gender, the unisex price is strongly correlated with the gender-based fair price.
The worst situation is when there is the same number of males and females.
5. Dependence on . When  is xed, both SCRu and SCRweighted increase with , for
all products. This is due to the fact that a greater shock to the survival probabilities
produces a higher SCR. This has dierent impact on the absolute and relative gap
between SCRu and SCRweighted. For the pure endowment with both durations, the
5From the mathematical point of view, this can be explained as follows. If  2 (0; 1) the function
g(x) = x   x is decreasing for x 2 (1=(1 ); 1). We notice that when  ranges in (0; 1), 1=(1 ) ranges
between 0.08 and 0.35. Given the initial age 35 and the duration T = 20; 30 years, we then have 1=(1 ) <
Sm(T ) < Sf (T ), that implies g(Sm(T )) > g(Sf (T )) in all cases of pure endowment.
23
absolute gap remains almost stable with , and the relative gap decreases with , the
maximum being at  = 0:1. For the annuity both the absolute and relative gap increase
with .
6 Implications of possible alternative practice on uni-
sex SCR
6.1 Two possible ways to deal with the EU Gender Directive
Insurance companies do not always seem to adopt the unisex fairness principle in pricing
unisex policies. Although ocially there is no clear disclosure of pricing procedures, in
practice there seem to be two ways to do unisex pricing: prevailing risk and weighted risk.
6.1.1 Prevailing risk: \max-risk procedure"
A possible way to deal with the EU Gender Directive is to consider the mixed portfolio as if
it were made only by high-risk policyholders, such as females for the pure endowment or the
annuity, and males for the term insurance or the whole life insurance. We are going to call
this procedure \max-risk-procedure": it is very conservative and implies charging always the
maximum between the two gender-based prices. It is obvious that the price charged with
the max-risk-procedure is higher than the unisex fair premium, and, in the considered cases
of pure endowment and lifetime annuity, their dierence increases with the males' portfolio
share .
6.1.2 Weighted risk: \weight-load procedure"
Another possible way to deal with the EU Gender Directive is to take all the one-year
survival rate of males and females and to mix them with weights that reect both the
portfolio composition  and the product issued, with an additional loading  on females or
males, depending on whether the product covers the risk of survival or the risk of death. We
are going to call this procedure \weight-load procedure". In particular, when the product
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covers against the risk of survival (pure endowment, annuity), more weight is given to the
females survival rate and the unisex one-year survival rate is given by
pwlx = (   )pmx + (1  (   ))pfx (37)
for some 0    .6 We stress that the weight-load-procedure is not equivalent to the unisex
fairness principle procedure, even with  = 0. Indeed, the unisex fairness principle implies
that for the pure endowment duration T the T -years unisex survival probability is a weighted
average with weights  and 1    of the males' and females' T -years survival probabilities
(see (7)), while for the annuity the k-year unisex survival probabilities are weighted averages
with weights  and 1    of the males' and females' k-years survival probabilities for all
k = 1; :::!   x (see (9)). It is not dicult to see that these conditions are violated if the
survival rates satisfy (37), also with  = 0. Therefore, the unisex price charged with the
weight-load procedure is dierent from the unisex fair premium, and in the practice it turns
out to be generally higher than that.
6.2 Consequences for the calculation of the SCR
In this section, we compare between the SCR calculated with the two alternative pricing
procedures illustrated in Section 6.1 and the fair solvency capital requirement SCRweighted
calculated in Section 5.2.
We x an equal proportion of genders in the portfolio,  = 0:5, and a shock on the survival
probabilities  = 0:5, and analyse the three products considered in Section 5, namely the
pure endowment 20 years, the pure endowment 30 years and the annuity. For the weight-
load procedure we set  = 0:1; 0:3; 0:5. Therefore, due to (37), the results for the max-risk
procedure coincide with those of the weight-load procedure in the case  = 0:5.
Table 5 reports the SCR with the weight-load procedure, SCRwl, and the SCR for the
max-risk procedure, SCRmr, that coincides with SCRwl with  = 0:5. It also reports their
absolute gap with respect to SCRweighted and their relative gap, for instance, (SCRmr  
SCRweighted)=SCRmr.
6When the product covers against the risk of death (term insurance, whole life), more weight is given to
the males survival rate and the unisex 1-year survival rate is given by pwlx = ( + )p
m
x + (1  ( + ))pfx.
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Table 5: SCRwlz () and SCR
mr(): dierence and relative dierence to SCRweighted() for
 = 0:5 and  = 0:5 depending on  and type of product. SCRmr() is the case SCRwl()
with  = 0:5.
Pure-endowment 20-years (SCRweighted = 0:012)

0.1 0.3 0.5
SCRwl 0.012 0.011 0.010
SCRwl   SCRweighted 0.000 -0.001 -0.003
Relative di. -4.08% -13.74% -25.46%
Pure-endowment 30-years (SCRweighted = 0:022 )

0.1 0.3 0.5
SCRwlz () 0.021 0.020 0.018
SCRwl   SCRweighted -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
Relative di. -3.72% -13.17% -24.71%
Annuity (SCRweighted = 3:268)

0.1 0.3 0.5
SCRwl 3.285 3.259 3.218
SCRwl   SCRweighted 0.017 -0.009 -0.050
Relative di. 0.52% -0.28% -1.55%
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We observe that the SCR for the max-risk procedure is always lower than the SCRweighted.
The explanation is equal to that given in comment 3 from Section 5.2 to explain why the
solvency capital requirement for females is lower than that for males. If the insurance
company behaves as if there are only females in the mixed portfolio, the price charged to
the males of the portfolio is higher than what should be, so less money is needed for the
solvency capital requirement, because excessive money has been set aside by the insurance
company. This is certainly a safe procedure for the solvency of the company, but the price
of this cautious procedure is paid only by the customers.
The weight-load procedure gives an intermediate situation between the max-risk proce-
dure and the weighted procedure. This is due to the fact that the survival probabilities used
are not equal to the females' ones as in the max-risk procedure, but they are closer to the
females' ones than they should be with just volume-related weights, due to the extra-loading
.
We notice a remarkable dierence between the pure endowment and the annuity. For
both pure endowments, the dierence SCRwl   SCRweighted is always lower than 0 and
the relative dierence becomes as high as  25% for higher values of . For the annuity,
SCRwl SCRweighted is positive with low values of  and becomes negative when  increases,
but the relative dierence is low. This means that there is an intermediate value of  for
which the weight-load procedure equals the weighted pre-Gender Directive approach.
7 Discussion and conclusion
Starting from the evidence that the EU Gender Directive obliges issuers of life insurance
products to charge the same premium to policyholders of dierent genders, we address the
issue of calculating solvency capital requirements for pure endowments and annuities issued
to mixed portfolios. We strongly support the use of the unisex fairness principle in the cal-
culation of the unisex single premium. We analyze the solvency capital requirement in the
two possible situations: (i) using the unisex fairness principle; (ii) not using it.
(i) Assuming that the insurer charges the unisex fair premium, we notice that he can
calculate the solvency capital requirement in two dierent ways:
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1. rst, with the unisex fair survival probability, as if the mixed portfolio was made by
m + n homogeneous mixed policyholders with fair unisex survival probabilities; with
this procedure we calculate the quantities SCRu;
2. second, mixing the SCR of males and females with volume-related weights, as if the
mixed portfolio was made by two subportfolios of m males and n females (in the same
way it was done before the EU Gender Directive, see Remark 2); with this procedure
we calculate the quantities SCRweighted.
We notice that the fair premium charged to the policyholders is the same in the two
cases. In Section 3.2 we show that the SCR at issuing time calculated with the fair unisex
survival probabilities is higher than or equal to that calculated for the two subportfolios.
In other words, if insurers treat the mixed portfolio as a portfolio of homogeneous unisex
policyholders with a fair unisex survival probability, they set aside for solvency requirements
more money than they would have done before the EU Gender Directive. We nd that the
relative gap between the SCRs calculated in the two dierent ways is negligible for pure
endowments, and it is at most of the order of 3% for annuities. The unisex solvency capital
requirement SCRu can be considered a good approximation of the fair solvency capital
requirement SCRweighted for pure endowments, and a cautious solvency capital requirement
for annuities.
(ii) Assuming that the insurer does not use the unisex fairness principle to calculate the
unisex tari, we nd that it is common practice to use survival probabilities closer or equal
to those of the females for pure endowments and annuities. We calculate the SCR according
to the distorted survival probabilities adopted. We get dierent results for pure endowments
and annuities. For pure endowments, in all cases, the distorted SCR is lower than the
SCRweighted that would have been calculated before the EU Gender Directive. The relative
dierence can be as high as  25%. The reason of this apparently counterintuitive inequality
lies in the fact that with distorted survival probabilities the premium charged by insurers is
much higher than the unisex fair price. Therefore, more money than needed is set aside in
the reserves at the policy inception, and less money than needed is required for the solvency
capital requirement. Both a higher unisex tari and a lower solvency capital requirement
seem good news for the insurer. However, the price to be paid for this advantage is paid
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entirely by the customer, who pays more than needed for the policy. For the annuity the
SCR calculated with distorted survival probabilities is lower than the SCRweighted if enough
extra-loading is assigned to the females' survival probabilities, while it becomes higher than
that for low enough extra-loading on females' survival probabilities. A correct selection of
the extra-loading becomes then relevant to insurers.
We consider the present paper as the starting point of a more articulate research project
on the eects of the EU Gender Directive on the calculation of Solvency Capital Requirements
for life insurance products. Products that pay in case of death such as whole and term life
insurance are missing from the present analysis but are important too. A detailed analysis
of the calculation of the SCR for products that pay in case of death is subject of ongoing
research.
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